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NOTES
LIABILITY OF SUBSCRIBER TO STOCK OF A COR-
PORATION BEFORE ITS ACTUAL
FORMATION
In view of the great impetus given to manufacturing concerns
throughout the country within the past few years, and the ever-increas-
ing number of corporations being formed every year, the question of
just what the liability of a subscriber to stock of a corporation before
its actual formation is one which has grown proportionally in im-
portance and complexity. And this complexity is increased by the
diversity of the corporation laws of the various states, and the conflict
in the decisions of the chief tribunals of the states of the United
States.
But before proceeding to take up the liability of the subscribers to
a corporation before its inception and actual formation, it may be well
to distinguish between an agreement or promise to subscribe in the
future and a present actual irrevocable subscription.
An agreement or promise to subscribe in the future to the stock
of a corporation before formation is not irrevocable and binding on
the person subscribing in the sense that it is a continuing offer which
can be accepted by the corporation at any time in the future and makes
the person agreeing to subscribe liable as a subscriber, for the full
value of the stock. As was said in Thrasher v. Pike County R. Co.,
25 I.. 393, where the defendants signed a paper as follows; "We, the
undersigned, agree to subscribe to the stock of the Pike County Rail-
road, the sums set against our names, when the books may be opened
for subscriptions," and the plaintiffs endeavored to hold the defendants
for the par value of the shares for which they had agreed to subscribe,
the court held that "an undertaking to subscribe a certain amount of
stock when books shall be opened does not make the subscriber a
stockholder and as such liable to calls." But the court in this case
went further and said, "Such a promise is like an agreement to
purchase any specific article of property; if there has not been a
delivery of or an offer to deliver the stock, the measure of damages is
not the value of the stock, but only such damages should be awarded
as would result from the loss of a bargain." This same opinion is
voiced in Mt. Sterling Coalroad Co. v. Little, 14 Bush (Ky.) 429,
Rhey v. Ebensburg, etc., Plank Road Co., 27 Pa. 261, and in Van
Schaick v. Mackin, 113 N. Y. S. 408.
Whether a contract for subscription of stock is a mere agreement
to subscribe for stock in the future or is a present subscription requiring
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no further action or agreement by the parties signing is a question of
construction and intention. And it is now almost universally held that
unless a contrary intention is clearly shown, an agreement to sub-
scribe to the stock of a corporation to be newly organized is a continuing
offer to the corporation, in other words a present subscription which
becomes of binding effect when the corporation is organized as pro-
posed and accepts the offer. This view is sustained in Bullock v.
Falmouth, etc.; Turnpike Road Co., 85 Ky. 184, 3 S. W. 129; Shelby
County R. Co. v. Crow, 137 Mo. App. 461, and Snodgrass v. Zander,
106 Ark. 462, 154 S. W. 212.
Now let us return to the chief subject under discussion, namely, the
"Liability of a subscriber to stock of a corporation before its actual
formation." In 14 Corpus Juris, Sec. 753, it is said, "Properly
speaking, subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation are mutual
agreements made upon the formation of a corporation to take and
pay for the shares of its capital stock. They are usually in the shape
of a mutual agreement in anticipation of incorporation, written and
signed by those desiring to be corporators and stockholders, and it
is well established, both upon natural reason and legal authority,
that such a subscription to the stock of a corporation is a contract
between the corporation on the one side, when expressly or impliedly
accepted by it, and the subscriber on the other, and that as such, the
courts of justice will enforce it for or against either party." Thus
we see that a stock subscription may be a purely common law contract
between the subscriber and the corporation, enforceable upon its for-
mation. And this is the view accepted in Planters, etc., Independent
Packing Co. v. Webb, 144 Ala. 666; Nebraska Chicory Co. v. Lduicky,
79 Nebr. 587; Pacific Mill Co. v. Inman, 46 Or. 352; McDowell v.
Lindsay, 213 Pa. 591, 63 At. Rep. 130, and Blunt v. Walker, 11
Wis. 334.
This general proposition stated above is nevertheless subject to
two interpretations, the one being that the signing of the papers is a
contract between the subscribers for the benefit of the corporation when
formed. So in effect the courts inclinings toward this view really con-
sider the contract of subscription a trilateral contract; an undertaking
not only with the corporation but also with the rest of the subscribers
to the stock, and furthermore even though the contract is fraudulent as
between two of the parties, it is still enforceable for the benefit of
the third party. This is the conception of the proposition as laid
down by the courts of the state of Missouri in DeGiverville Land Co.
v. Thompson, 190 Mo. App. 682, and Shelby County R. Co. v. Crow,
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137 Mo. App. 461. Other cases supporting this view are Marles
Carved Molding Co. v. Stubb, 215 Pa. 91, and Philadelphia, etc., R.
Co. v. Conway, 177 Pa. 364. In Planters & Merchants I. P. Co. v.
Webb, 39 So. 562, it was held: "An agreement by which a person
shows an intention to become a stockholder in a corporation is suffi-
cient as a contract of subscription as against both him and the cor-
poration." And in Nebraska Chickory Co. v. Leduicky (1907) 79
Neb. 587, the court said: "A subscription by a number of persons to
the stock of a corporation to be thereafter formed by them, constitutes
a contract between the subscribers themselves to become stockholders
when the corporation is formed, upon the condition expressed in the
agreement, and as such it is binding and irrevocable 'from the date
of the subscription."
Proceeding now to the second interpretation of the previously
announced general propostion we find it to be in substance and to the
effect that the signing of the papers by a prospective subscriber is a
mere offer to contract. But proceeding further it is more than that,
it is a continuing offer becoming binding upon the formation of the
corporation. As stated in 14 Corpus Juris, Sec. 766. Before the cor-
poration is formed, the subscriptions, as we shall see, are not binding
at common law between the subscriber and the proposed corporation,
for there is no consideration or mutuality; and, besides this, the other
party to the contract, the corporation, is not yet in existence; but the
formation of the corporation and express or implied acceptance of the
subscriptions by its supply the element of consideration and the other
party, and render them binding." This is the doctrine laid down in
McNaught v. Fisher, 96 Fed. 168; Danbury, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson,
22 Conn. 435; Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encamp-
ment Co., 140 Ill. 248. In McNaught v. Fisher, 96 Fed. 168, Judge
Thomas in speaking of the contract of subscription says: "This con-
tract, until accepted by the corporation, existed only as to the sub-
scribers thereto, but upon such acceptance, the corporation became a
party to it, and it became binding according to its terms." So we
plainly see that according to this theory the signing of the papers of
subscription is a continuing offer to contract, becoming binding upon
the formation of the corporation.
But now recurring once more to the general proposition that a
stock subscription may be a common law contract between the sub-
scriber and the corporation when formed, we find that said doctrine
also has its limitations, in fact, is hedged about by many limitations,
the most important of which is that like any other contract, the terms
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of the contract must be strictly fulfilled by both paries, and a breach
or nonfulfillment of the contract by the corporation will release
the subscriber from liability. As Judge Brace stated in Haskell v.
Worthington, 94 Mo. 560, "Where a corporation, incorporated under
the general law requiring that the amount of its stock be stated in
the certificate of incorporation, enters into active business with less
capital stock subscribed than the amount thus stated, a subscriber, who
is not estopped by his acts from making such defense, cannot be held
to his subscription." These words from this Missouri case plainly
show that the terms of the contract must be strictly fulfilled in order
to make the contract of subscription of binding effect, and other
cases supporting this docrine are Salem Mill-dam v. Roper, 6 Pick 23;
Cabut and West Springfield Bridge v. Chapin, 6 Cush. 50, and Wor-
cester and Nashua R. R. Co. v. Hinds, 9 Cush. 110. And this is the
prevailing rule throughout the country and is sustained by the decisions
of most of the tribunals which have passed upon that subject.
E. C. H.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss2/6
